We study the impact of a national energy efficiency program on total factor productivity (TFP) growth in firms in China's iron and steel industry. Using detailed firm-level survey data and multiple approaches to estimate program effects, we find participating firms experienced greater annualized TFP change. Our base specification estimates the program increased annual TFP growth by 3.1 percentage points, implying an annual private benefit of 148.7 million RMB/year per firm, with approximately equal contributions from technical change and scale efficiency change. Our results suggest that firms undervalued energy efficiency investments prior to the start of the program.
Literature and empirical setting

Impact of energy efficiency on firm productivity
The vast majority of studies that estimate the impact of energy efficiency programs examine developed country settings, typically focus on individual or household decisions, and do not consider productivity effects. These studies have found evidence that the engineering projections of recurring savings used to justify energy efficiency programs have been overestimated. One study of a weatherization program in the U.S. estimated that model-projected savings exceeded actual savings by 2.5 times, while the actual rate of return to the program was negative (Fowlie et al., 2018) . A recent study of housing rental markets in the U.S. found different rates of energy efficiency investment, depending on whether tenants or owners paid for energy (Myers, 2018) . Such studies in developing countries are rare, but similar to Fowlie et al. (2018) suggest savings are initially overstated. For instance, Davis et al. (2014) found that a large-scale appliance replacement program in Mexico achieved only one-quarter of the energy savings projected ex ante. All of these studies involve individual or household decisions; in a study involving schools, Burlig et al. (2017) found that energy efficiency projects resulted in savings of 2-5% on average, while realized savings were 50% lower than ex ante projected savings.
In the case of firms, a multiple studies have found negative productivity effects of environmental regulations (e.g. pollution limits) on firms (Gollop & Roberts, 1983; Gray & Shadbegian, 2003; Greenstone, List, & Syverson, 2012; Koźluk & Zipperer, 2013) . Gollop and Roberts (1983) focus on sulfur dioxide emissions limits in the US electric power industry by estimating a cost function using observations of 56 electric utilities between 1973 and 1979. They find a negative effect of the regulation on TFP growth of 0.59 percentage points per year, mainly due to the higher cost of low sulfur fuel. Gray and Shadbegian (2003) study the effect of the US Clean Air and Clean Water Acts of the early 1970s on 116 pulp and paper mills in the United States from 1979 to 1990. They find that higher pollution abatement operating costs lowered TFP levels by about 2.6% annually, and that the magnitude of this effect depended on a plant's technology. Greenstone et al. (2012) study the effect of the Clean Air Act Amendment on TFP levels in a large sample of US manufacturing plants over the period from 1972 to 1993. TFP levels of polluting plants located in non-attainment counties (subject to more stringent pollution limits) are found to be significantly negatively affected in the range of 2.6 to 4.8% on average .
There is little empirical evidence of the magnitude and direction of the firm-level productivity impact of efforts to raise industrial energy efficiency anywhere in the world. Despite this, energy efficiency programs have been widely adopted in developing countries on the basis that they will not impede economic growth, because these programs index energy saving targets to economic activity. Indeed, the term "energy saving" can be misleading because economic growth at a rate that exceeds the rate of decline in energy intensity in a given period will result in an increase in absolute energy use. Many developing countries, including China and India, have adopted efficiency or intensity-based targets to implement their national climate change mitigation goals. The closest setting to ours, which uses a different (experimental) methodology, is Ryan (2018) , which finds manufacturing plants in India respond to an energy efficiency treatment by hiring more skilled labor and increasing output, resulting in higher energy use in the treatment relative to the control group.
To study the productivity impacts of state-mandated increases in energy efficiency in a developing country setting, we choose to focus on China in the mid-2000s, when its central government introduced an energy efficiency program for the first time. China experienced rapid economic growth averaging 10% in real terms between 1980 and 2010, and emerged by the end of this period as the world's largest energy-using nation. Prior studies of China's energy efficiency programs have quantified changes in energy efficiency or emissions levels (see for example Xu and Lin (2016) and Zhou and Yang (2016) ), but not firm productivity. Our work also contributes to a large literature that estimates trends and probes determinants of productivity growth in China (see Tian and Yu (2012) and Wu (2011) for an extensive review).
Intuition
The impact of an energy efficiency program on firm productivity depends on how firm managers trade off the upfront cost of energy efficiency investments against discounted energy savings. Below, we define investment inefficiencies with respect to energy efficiency capital, and show how positive productivity effects could result from reducing the magnitude of these inefficiencies. We begin with the basic framework from Allcott et al. (2012) , which suggests that firms will invest in energy efficiency if the upfront cost c is lower than the discounted benefits, formalized in Eq. (1): 
where e 0 is the baseline energy intensity and e 1 is the energy intensity of the efficient variant of a production technology. Energy prices p and unobserved opportunity costs or benefits ξ are assumed constant across firms, while a firm's taste for an energy efficient good is captured by m i . The parameter g i captures the extent to which a firm under-or over-values energy savings, and serves as a sufficient statistic for a broad range of investment inefficiencies (Allcott et al., 2012) . The only difference from the earlier Allcott and Greenstone (2012) framework is that here we explicitly allow g i to be firm specific, similar to the setting in Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky (2014) . For instance, agents may misperceive expected energy cost savings; savings may be genuinely uncertain for a fixed amount of investment; agents may not reap savings because buyers of their products lower prices to reflect the reduction in costs; or firms may lack access to credit at the risk-adjusted discount rate.
M. Filippini, et al. China Economic Review 59 (2020) 101364 We are interested in how the productivity impact of mandating an increase in energy efficiency depends on a firm's value of g. Governments do not observe g when designing energy efficiency programs. If g = 1 or g > 1, increasing energy efficiency will lead to overinvestment in energy efficiency and TFP loss. However, common assumptions supported by empirical findings suggest g ≤ 1 (Allcott et al., 2014) . Therefore, if an energy efficiency target requires a firm for which g < 1 to raise its energy efficiency by investing at a level corresponding to g = 1, its costs would fall because its additional investment has unlocked discounted energy savings that, contrary to the firm's original assessment, more than offset the firm's upfront cost, hence increase the TFP. If the efficiency target exceeds the optimal level, the firm will overinvest in energy efficiency, and TFP may decrease compared to the level without policy.
In practice, g varies across firms. An intervention that mandates improvements in energy efficiency will therefore affect different firms differently. In a population of heterogeneous targeted firms, the net impact of mandating increased efficiency on the productivity of the average firm is ultimately an empirical question.
Industry context
We estimate the impact of an energy efficiency program on firm productivity in China's iron and steel industry in the mid-2000s. Our research setting typifies the conditions of an energy-intensive industry in a developing country during a period of rapid economic expansion, although we recognize that the scale, pace, and drivers of China's economic expansion are in many respects unique. Between 1985 and 2013, the industry's output grew on average by 10.8%, and constituted 49.8% of global iron and steel output in 2013 (IISI, 1986 (IISI, , 2002 WSA, 2014) . Total energy consumption in the industry increased at a slightly slower rate of 8.7% per year between 1985 and 2010 (Lin & Wang, 2014) . In 2013, the iron and steel industry accounted for 29% of the total energy used in China's manufacturing sector and 23.6% of total energy used in industry (NBS, 2014) . Iron and steel production is also one of the country's major sources of pollution (He et al., 2013) . During the study period, the industry ranked third as a source of carbon dioxide emissions in China (after power generation and cement), accounting for roughly 10% (Zeng, Lan, & Huang, 2009 ). The iron and steel industry's high energy consumption is in large measure attributable to the characteristics of its production processes. Compared to the iron and steel industries of developed nations, aggregate measures (above the firm level) suggest that China's industry uses energy more intensively in production (He et al., 2013; Ross & Feng, 1991; Zhang & Wang, 2008) .
Energy efficiency treatment
The central government launched the national Top 1000 Firms Energy Conservation Program (T1000P) at the start of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP) in April 2006 (Zhou, Levine, & Price, 2010) . It required the country's largest 1008 energy-consuming industrial firms, defined as firms consuming a minimum of 180,000 tons of coal equivalent (tce) in 2004, in nine industries to substantially reduce their energy intensity (the ratio of energy used to output produced) (Price, Wang, & Yun, 2010) . The energy consumption cutoff was the sole criterion used to determine program participation. The program was designed to support the Eleventh FYP's (2006 -2010 target of reducing national energy intensity (energy use per GDP) by 20% (State Council, 2006) . The government rolled out the program rapidly in response to the observation that by 2004, a long decline in the energy intensity of China's economy, largely attributed to the gradual dismantling of central planning since the 1980s, appeared to have reversed (Ke et al., 2012) . One study notes that energy conservation was not an industry priority before the mid-2000s (Zhang & Wang, 2008) . The program was administered by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China's major economic planning body, and was the first of its kind in China.
Energy intensity targets for firms participating in the T1000P were set in agreements between the provincial government and the firm Zhao, Li, Wu, & Qi, 2014) . Targets were initially assigned in proportion to each province's energy-saving targets, which during the Eleventh FYP were very similar and corresponded closely to the national target of reducing energy intensity by 20% by 2010, relative to 2005 levels. Targets were then adjusted based on a firm's pre-regulation share in the energy use of all firms included in the T1000P (Zhao et al., 2014; Zhao, 2016) . As the program was set up very rapidly, the target setting process was not based on an assessment of individual firms' energy conservation potential or costs Price et al., 2011) .
In each program year, covered firms self-reported their progress toward energy intensity targets directly to the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) following predefined reporting standards (Zhou et al., 2010) . For many firms, this was the first time reporting was required. Provincial governments evaluated data quality and firm compliance on an annual basis. Assessment included short on-site inspections, but was mainly based on firms' self-reporting, due to limited inspection capacity and the complexity of calculating the energy conservation indicator (Li, Zhao, Yu, Wu, & Qi, 2016; Zhao et al., 2014 Zhao et al., , 2016 . If discovered, fraudulent reporting could lead to a criminal investigation (Zhou et al., 2010) .
Penalties for non-compliance were both financial and non-financial. While the nature and extent of penalties varied at the provincial level, all firms faced heightened public scrutiny. The government publicly released the list of firms in the T1000P, drawing heightened media attention (Price et al., 2011) . Some firms reportedly implemented incentive payments for their staff conditional on the achievement of energy conservation targets, which also included salary limits if compliance was not achieved (Zhao et al., 2014) . Furthermore, state administrators evaluated leaders of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local government officials based on their achievement of the T1000P energy-saving targets (Li et al., 2016; State Council, 2007; Zhao et al., 2014) . For the first time, energy conservation achievement was included in the personnel appraisal system (Zhou et al., 2010) . Leaders of state-owned firms or local governments could be denied promotions and honorary titles if targets were not met (Koakutsu, Usui, Watarai, & Takagi, 2012) . Noncompliant firms were required to submit a written report to government authorities specifying a plan for rectifying non-compliance M. Filippini, et al. China Economic Review 59 (2020) 101364 (Zhao et al., 2014) . The T1000P was introduced on top of a program that provided government support for energy-efficiency investments to all firms, not only those participating in the T1000P (Ke et al., 2012; Price et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2014) . These resources included consulting support and energy audits, information benchmarking firm performance to peers, and information on how to apply for financial assistance for approved energy retrofits. Provincial energy conservation centers were established to make these resources available to firms (Qi, 2013) .
By its initial benchmarks, the program exceeded expectations. At the outset, the program targeted a "reduction" of 100 mtce by 2010, relative to estimated energy use assuming no change in firms' energy intensity (NDRC, 2006) . Target achievement was reported early in 2008 when the NDRC announced savings of approximately 106 mtce (Ke et al., 2012) , similar to Price et al. (2011) , who estimated savings of 124 mtce by 2008. By 2010, estimates of energy conservation for the entire five-year period far exceeded the initial target: Zhao (2016) reported savings of 165 mtce, while Ke et al. (2012) found savings of 150 mtce. Program compliance was reportedly high: at the conclusion of T1000P in 2010, only 1.7% of the firms did not comply (NDRC, 2011) . 2 Citing these measures of progress achievement, the NDRC expanded the T1000P to the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program in the Twelfth FYP (2011-2015) (Zhao, 2016) .
Data
Industrial survey
Our data set is assembled using firm entries in the Chinese Annual Industrial Survey (CAIS) for the years 2003 to 2008, which is compiled by the NBS. The CAIS represents the most extensive source of firm level information on the Chinese manufacturing sector available to researchers. It contains yearly observations of the balance sheet, income statement, and other non-financial information for all industrial firms registered in China with a yearly sales value higher than 5 million Chinese renminbi (RMB), which corresponds to approximately 800,000 US dollars, and all SOEs (independently of their sales value). Most firms are single plant firms (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, & Zhang, 2012) . All costs and output values are deflated to a reference year (1998) using four-digit industry-specific input and output deflators, which were used by Brandt et al. (2012) and provided by Johannes Van Biesebroeck at KU Leuven. Information on firms participating in the T1000P was obtained from the NDRC. Of these firms, 1001 out of 1008 (99.3%) were successfully matched with the CAIS. While the prices of labor and capital are derived from information contained in the CAIS, the price of material was not provided. The subindustry-(iron and steel, steel rolling, and ferroalloy smelting) and province-specific annual price of material is calculated based on information on subindustry inputs and outputs obtained from the NBS (2007), coal prices and electricity prices extracted from CEIC (2015) and iron ore prices from CCM (2015). These prices then are adjusted for inflation using an overall price deflator provided by the NBS (2013).
Characteristics of treated and non-treated firms
The CAIS records a total of 13,278 firms in the iron and steel industry (or more precisely, in the ferrous metal smelting and rolling industry) over the period of 2003 to 2008. In this sample, 5340 firms are considered for the empirical analysis, after cleaning and panel construction as described in Appendix A. The panel of firms is unbalanced with 2047 observations (or 38.3%) forming a balanced panel, while 37.3% of the sample was observed for five years, 18.4% for four years, 5.0% for three years, and 0.9% for two years. Descriptive statistics of the 5340 firms for the full sample period are given in Table 1 in columns 1 to 4. Firm heterogeneity with respect to several of these variables is large. For example, the 25th percentile of gross output value is 7.3 times smaller than the 75th percentile value, while it is 4.5 for the number of people employed. The iron-and steelmaking subindustry accounts for 18.3% of the observations, steel rolling for 64.3%, and ferroalloy smelting subindustry for 17.4%. Furthermore, 0.6% of the observations are central SOEs, 9.4% are local SOEs, and 90.0% are non-SOEs, whereby a firm is defined as being an SOE if its controlling (minority or majority) shareholder is the state. In China's iron and steel industry, state ownership fell dramatically during the period of economic reform, resulting in only a limited number of SOEs remaining by our study period.
Empirical strategy and identification
In our base specification, we implement a two-stage approach to estimate the effect of the T1000P on firm productivity growth. We first specify a cost function as the basis for computing total factor productivity (TFP) change and for further resolving its subcomponents, technical change and scale efficiency change. 3 Second, a difference-in-difference (DID) approach is used to estimate the effect of the program on TFP change. 4 The disaggregation of TFP change into its subcomponents yields further insights in terms of whether firms responded to the regulation via technical change TC (e.g., by installing new machinery) or scale efficiency SEC (e.g., by realizing economies of scale as output increased).
Formulation of the cost function and derivation of TFP change
TFP analysis can be performed using parametric and non-parametric approaches. For instance, within the parametric methods, it is possible to use a production or a cost function/cost frontier approach, whereas within the non-parametric methods, it is possible to use index numbers such as the Törnqvist index or Data Envelopment Analysis. To derive TFP change, here we use a parametric approach based on the estimation of a cost function. 5 However, as robustness check, we also compute the TFP change of the firms using two index number approaches (Törnqvist index, as described in Coelli, Estache, Perelman, and Trujillo (2003) , and the index used by Allcott et al. (2012) , and three methods based on the parametric estimation of a production function proposed by Wooldridge (2009), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) , and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) . Profitability is the ratio of total profits to gross output. Column 7 shows the difference in means of the treatment and control group. 4 As discussed in Wang and Schmidt (2002) , using a two-stage approach is not always an option solution. For this reason, as a robustness test, we present in Section 5.9 the results using a one-stage approach based on the measurement of TFP change using two productivity index numbers, and they are robust. 5 One advantage of a cost function over a production function is that fewer explanatory variables are likely to be endogeneous. In the estimation of a production function all the inputs usually are endogenous. In the estimation of a cost function the variable that potentially could be endogenous is the output. In model specification (3) we cannot exclude a priori that the output is endogenous. However, we can assume that the input prices are exogenous. This is supported by the fact that in China input prices are either set by the state (e.g. for electricity) or determined in commodity markets (e.g. for coal), rendering them plausibly exogenous to firm decisions. In order to solve the potential endogeneity of the output variable we could use an IV or a GMM approach. In our case, also because we don't have a powerful instrument, we think that the use of a fixed effects approach is already attenuating this potential problem. Moreover, to probe the robustness of our results, we also estimate and perform the empirical analysis using values for the TFP change obtained via a non-parametric method, as well as the methods of Wooldridge (2009), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) , and Ackerberg et al. (2015) . For a review of all methods to measure the TFP change see del Gatto, Di Liberto, and Petraglia (2011) . For a presentation of the use of a cost function see Lowell and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) .
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TFP change is further disaggregated into the two subcomponents of scale efficiency change (SEC, the term on the second line) and technical change (TC, the term on the third line). Total costs are represented by C it and the single output is Y. Output elasticities (which are the inverse of the returns to scale elasticity) at a data point are estimated as described in Coelli et al. (2003) .
A calculation of TFP change according to Eq.
(2) necessitates the empirical specification of a cost function for the Chinese iron and steel industry, which can be divided into three sub-industries s: iron-and steelmaking, steel rolling, and ferroalloy smelting. To improve comparability, we empirically estimate a separate cost function for each sub-industry. In this study, we assume a subindustry s-specific production process as follows:
Total costs C are defined as the sum of intermediate input costs (which includes all energy costs), labor costs and capital costs. Costs include depreciation and interest expenses and an assumed opportunity cost of equity of 3%. 6 The single output Y is deflated gross output. 7 The price of labor P L is represented by the ratio of the sum of wage and welfare payments to the number of employees. The price of capital P K is defined as capital costs divided by the real capital stock. The calculation of the real capital stock is based on the perpetual inventory method (see Appendix A). The main materials used in the production of iron and steel are coal, coke, iron and electricity. The subindustry s-and province r-specific price of material P M is derived via a Törnqvist price index of these four main material inputs. A linear time trend t is added to the cost function in order to control for technical change. All costs and output are deflated to 1998 values using the respective input and output deflators, as described in Appendix A. Descriptive statistics of the main covariates are given in Table 1 .
For the estimation of Eq.
(3) we use a translog functional form (Berndt & Christensen, 1973; Christensen, Jorgenson, & Lau, 1973) , since this form does not impose a priori restrictions on the technology parameters. The subindustry s-specific cost functions are specified as 
with lower case letters y and p indicating output and prices in natural logarithms. The intercept α 0 represents total costs at the approximation point. Firm fixed effects are captured by α i and control for firm-specific, time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 8 The error term is given by ε it . Sub-industry-specific median values of the explanatory variables are chosen as approximation points of the translog cost functions. Eq. (4) is estimated using a fixed effects estimator, that is, running OLS on Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) . 7 We are aware that a physical measure of TFP would be superior to a value-based measure, because quality or market power varying over time in a heterogeneous way could also influence these values. Unfortunately, as in several other studies estimating a cost or production function for industrial sectors (see e.g., Allcott et al. (2012) , Gray and Shadbegian (2003) , or Levinson and Petrin (2003)), we do not have quantity or qualityrelated information. 8 As discussed in Lee, Stoyanov, & Zubanov (2019) , when measuring TFP changes it is important to consider firm fixed effects in the econometric analysis. These fixed effects, for instance, should capture time-constant conditions affecting the outcome of a firm, e.g., geographic heterogeneity like a favorable geographic location close to iron and coal mines or ports (Greenstone, 2002) , preferential political treatment, regional differences in the application and enforcement of regulation targets etc.
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Identification strategy
To estimate the effect of the T1000P on TFP change using a difference-in-difference (DID) approach, two important assumptions need to be satisfied for identification (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004) . First, a firm's selection into the energy conservation program should be exogenous. Second, prior to treatment, there should be a parallel trend in the outcome variable for both treatment and control firms.
Two lines of reasoning support the validity of the first assumption. First, the program originated at the central government level, without consent or input from firms regarding its creation or initial design. For instance, the energy use threshold (180,000 tce/year) that determined program inclusion was relatively arbitrary. Importantly, firms could not self-select into the program. A nationwide program focused on raising energy efficiency was new to China at the time, issued in response to unexpected evidence that China's multi-decadal decline in energy intensity had reversed in 2004, making it unlikely that firms anticipated the program's introduction; previously, many firms did not even emphasize or track energy use (Ke et al., 2012) .
Second, we might worry that treated firms differed systematically from untreated firms in observed or unobserved ways that affected their response to the program. For this reason, we use several alternative approaches to construct a more comparable control group, including matching and stratification. We include firm fixed effects α i to avoid bias in case time-invariant unobserved firm level heterogeneity is not orthogonal to the treatment effects or other covariates. We also include time fixed effects, θ t , to capture year-specific shocks to firm performance common to all firm, for instance, output market disruptions or political shifts on a national level.
For the DID approach to yield valid results, the second assumption of parallel trends prior to treatment must be satisfied. If the parallel trend assumption holds, the average effect of the regulation on TFP change in treated firms, or the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), can be identified as
This procedure can be followed analogously to analyze the ATT for TC and SEC by replacing TFPC with one of these other outcome variables. Treatment status is captured by the binary variable ρ t , equal to one for all regulation periods and zero otherwise, with the first year of treatment being 2006. The binary variable τ i indicates whether or not a firm was part of the treatment group. The ATT is estimated by the coefficient β ATT . Vector X it contains variables for ownership structure and firm size to control for timevarying heterogeneity affecting firm performance. Size effects are controlled for by the natural logarithm of the number of firm employees. Ownership-related effects are measured by a binary variable differentiating between SOEs and non-SOEs. Province-year effects θ t π i control for province π i -and year θ t -specific shocks. The two-way fixed effects model in Eq. (5) is estimated again using cluster robust sandwich estimates at the firm level. This avoids a potential downward bias in the estimated standard errors of the treatment effect due to uncontrolled positive serial correlation.
We test the parallel trends assumption by estimating the following expression, with the year of implementation of the regulation indicated by T*:
Eq. (6) estimates a time trend for the treated group (indicated by "tr"), t i tr = tτ i , and uses observations of the pre-treatment period only. Our implementation follows Autor (2003) , Lachowska and Myck (2018) , and Angrist and Pischke (2008) . The finding of no significant difference in the productivity trend in treatment versus control firms supports the null hypothesis of = 0 t tr , i.e., is consistent with the parallel trends assumption.
A similar test shown in Eq. (7) is not rejected, our assumption of no pre-treatment effects remains unchallenged. In contrast to Eq. (6), Eq. (7) makes use of the full panel of observations. It also includes an estimation of the ATT. Firm fixed effects α i capture the information in the covariate (treatment status) as well, and therefore it is not included in the above three specifications. Tests for a parallel trend and pre-treatment effects in TC and SEC are conducted analogously by replacing TFPC with one of these variables. Table 2 presents estimated values of TFP change (TFPC) and its subcomponents, technical change (TC) and scale efficiency change (SEC). Results were derived using the estimated cost function coefficients (reported in Table C .2 in the Appendix). The cost functions for the three subindustries are well behaved, i.e. monotonic (see Table C .3 in the Appendix) and quasi-concave (Table C .4 in the Appendix). Details of the monotonicity and quasi-concavity test are described in Appendix D.
Results
TFPC is positive for all three subindustries between 2003 and 2008. In the main specification, TC contributes about 60% to the average TFP change, while the remainder is attributed to SEC. Firms in all three subindustries on average were found to exhibit positive returns to scale, see Table C .5 in the Appendix). The iron-and steelmaking subindustry shows the highest average TFP growth, followed by the steel rolling and ferroalloy smelting subindustries. TC is the dominant contributor to TFP growth in the steel rolling subindustry, while TC and SEC are roughly equally important in the ferroalloy smelting industry.
Effect of the regulation on TFP change
In what follows, we describe the effects of the T1000P on TFP change and its subcomponents using a DID approach. Focusing first on the two tests for parallel trends, we do not reject the hypothesis of parallel trends in TFP change and its subcomponents (see Table  C .1). While the visual evidence in Appendix Fig. C.1 shows higher TFPC in the control group, the evolution of TFPC before the introduction of the policy does not differ statistically between treated and control firms: The regression results find no evidence of a statistically significant difference in pre-treatment TPFC, regardless of whether specification (6) or (7) is used, as shown in Table C .1, Panel A and B, respectively.
Treatment effects are estimated based on Eq. (5), and results are shown in Table 3 . 9 We estimate and compare three model specifications (DD-1 to DD-3). The most parsimonious specification is the first model (DD-1). The second model (DD-2) additionally accounts for time varying heterogeneity related to ownership and size. Finally, the third model (DD-3) allows for year-specific shocks on a provincial level as local government officials and SOE leaders are evaluated annually on the achievement of their T1000P (and other) targets. Political shocks on a provincial level could potentially affect the enforcement of the regulation in a particular year. All three models include firm fixed effects and capture shocks at the national level via year fixed effects. Filippini, et al. China Economic Review 59 (2020) 101364 We find positive, statistically-significant effects of the program on firm TFPC. Estimated treatment effects are robust in terms of sign, magnitude and significance across all three model specifications. The third model is our preferred specification, as it most extensively controls for potential cofounding factors. Model specification DD-3 estimates a 3.1 percentage point increase in the annual TFP growth rate due to the program, equivalent to an annual private benefit to the average treated firm of 148.7 million RMB/ year. 10 Both subcomponents TC and SEC are significantly affected by the program and, on average, contribute about equally to the overall treatment effect. Fig. C.1 presents yearly TFPC, TC and SEC values for the treatment and control groups.
Extended analysis
We undertake six alternative approaches to estimate the effect of the T1000P on treated firms. These include approaches to ensure comparability of our control group (stratification and matching), to examine an analogous intervention at the provincial level to address concerns about differences in firm scale, to evaluate robustness to sample attrition and a possible confounder, to address endogeneity in program targeting by instrumenting for treatment, and to test sensitivity to the approach used in productivity estimation. Taken together, estimated treatment effects using these approaches are similar in sign and magnitude to our benchmark results. Results of these extended analyses are summarized in Table 4 , and described below.
Classical sample stratification by size and ownership
Firm size and ownership could plausibly affect a firm's response to the T1000P. Firms that differ in size may face divergent possibilities to reduce energy intensity by altering the scale of operations; firms that differ in ownership may face different costs of capital or receive different levels of state assistance that could affect their responses to the program. We therefore stratify the sample by size and ownership to improve the comparability of treated and control firms (Greenstone, 2002; Meyer, 1995) . 11 Every stratum contains a sufficient number of observations of treated firms to support statistical inference (see Table C .6 in the Appendix). First, we re-estimate model (4) based on a sample that only includes firms in the fourth quartile of the size distribution. As the main selection criterion of the T1000P was energy consumption of at least 180,000 tce in 2004, only large firms were exposed to the regulation and thus all treated firms belong to the fourth quartile of the size distribution. Shown in Table 4 , our results are similar to our benchmark results in Table 3 , with treatment effects being slightly larger for the sample including only large firms (see Table C .7 in the Appendix).
Second, we stratify by firm ownership. Prior work suggests that productivity levels differ among firms of different ownership, with SOEs less productive than private (non-SOE) firms (Dougherty, Herd, & He, 2007) . Responses to the program may also differ. We Henan, and Xinjiang (NDRC, 2007) . We successfully matched 115 firms with the CAIS data. Among the ten provinces, only Shanxi and Jiangsu had more than ten firms matched (47 and 40 firms respectively, in total 87 firms). Therefore, we limit the sample for this robustness check to these two provinces and remove these 87 firms from the main analysis to avoid any potentially confounding effect from this program. 10 An annual increase in TFP change of 3.1 percentage points corresponds to a yearly increase in TFP levels of treated firms of e 0.031 − 1 ≅ 0.031 compared to non-treated firms. Treated firms showed an average gross output of 4795.8 mRMB in 1998 values before the introduction of the regulation. Hence, on a per firm basis, a back-of-the-envelope calculation of average annual private benefits induced by the regulation through productivity gains for the period of 2006 to 2008 yields 148.7 million RMB (in 1998 values). 11 In addition to size and ownership, we also test whether stratification with respect to subindustry affiliation and geographic region change our results (see Table C .7- Table C .12). Results using stratified samples are in line with the results of the benchmark specification of Table 3 .
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Sample stratification by matching
Matching is conducted using propensity score matching to the nearest two neighbors with replacement in year 2005, applying a caliper of 0.25 following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) . We implement two approaches. In matching approach 1, we match based on gross output, with exact matching based on four-digit sector code categories. Matching is only conducted on firms employing more than 100 employees, as in 2005 no treated firm employed fewer. While achieving closer similarity in the control and treatment groups on a range of observables (see Table 1 and Table C .9 in the Appendix), the resulting sample is still unbalanced on firm size (see Table C .9 in the Appendix). In a similar setting, Wagner, Muûls, Martin, and Colmer (2014) face a similar situation, in which treated firms (in the European Union's Emissions Trading System) are systematically larger than control firms after matching. Therefore, in matching approach 2, we follow Wagner et al. (2014) and match based on capital intensity, i.e. the ratio of the real capital stock to output. Matching based on capital intensity helps to ensure that both groups of firms are similar in terms of production technology. Firm size is explicitly controlled for in the subsequent difference-in-difference estimation. Matching approach 2 also includes exact matching on the four-digit sector code to further improve comparability of production technology.
After applying the above procedure, 95 and 218 matched firms form the control groups for matching strategy 1 and 2, respectively (see Table C .6 in the Appendix). A comparison of Table 1 and Table C .9 in the Appendix shows that the matched control group is indeed more similar to the treatment group compared to the population average of non-treated iron and steel firms, while matching based on capital intensity yields two statistically-similar groups (see Table C .10 in the Appendix). Results of the second stage shown in Table C.11 and Table C .12 in the Appendix are robust to our benchmark results in terms of magnitude and significance for the overall effect on TFP change. While the magnitude of the effect on technical change decreased, the effect on scale efficiency change increased.
Provincial energy conservation program
To further ensure that our results are not driven by variables correlated with the large size threshold of the national program, we evaluate the productivity impact of a variant of the T1000P introduced by several provinces to augment the national program. 12 For these provincial energy conservation programs, energy use thresholds for inclusion were much lower than the national program and, importantly, varied across provinces. Hence, we can now compare firms of similar size and activity composition that differed only in treatment status across provincial boundaries as well as within provinces on either side of the energy use cutoff that determined program coverage, although our sample size is unfortunately reduced. We focus on 19 firms that were part of a provincial energy conservation program (and excluded from the national program). These firms on average were around 7.7 times smaller in terms of gross output compared to firms treated by the national program. Results shown in Table C .13 in the Appendix indicate robustness of our benchmark results on the program's overall effect on TFP change in terms of sign, with some reduction in magnitude. Significance, however, is mostly lost, which is perhaps unsurprising given the small sample size. The statistically-significant effect of the regulation on productivity is dominated by the channel of technical change, suggesting that the scale efficiency channel is less important in smaller firms of comparable size.
Sample attrition
Firm exit could result in an upward bias of treatment effects, if firms experiencing low TFP growth leave the sample over time (Baltagi, 2008) . The sample without attrition is defined by the 2047 firms observed for the full range of years 2003 to 2008 plus the 1354 firms first observed in 2004 that are older than zero years and are subsequently observed until 2008. The re-definition of the sample necessitates a re-calculation of the approximation points of the subindustry-specific translog cost functions and a subsequent re-estimation of TFPC, TC and SEC values. The estimated coefficients of the subindustry-specific cost functions are given in Table C .14 in the Appendix and the firm performance estimates given in Table C .15 in the Appendix. The null hypothesis of a parallel trend in firm performance before the introduction of the regulation is not rejected for the new sample (see Table C .16 in the Appendix). Results using the sample with no attrition yields results that are similar in terms of sign, magnitude and significance compared to those based on the corresponding benchmark specification (see Table C .17 in the Appendix). The benchmark estimates are robust to attrition bias, while the effect of technical change TC gains slightly in importance when using a more balanced panel.
Instrumenting for regulation exposure
We apply an instrumental variables (IV) approach as an additional strategy to account for potential time-varying unobserved heterogeneity not orthogonal to T1000P exposure. For example, unobserved, time-varying firm characteristics (e.g., political connections) could be correlated with both treatment status and the outcome variable(s). We therefore construct an instrument for 12 In preceding analysis, we excluded all firms known to be part of these programs from our estimation sample. M. Filippini, et al. China Economic Review 59 (2020) 101364 T1000P participation that equals the distance-weighted index of the ratio of the number of treated firms to the total number of firms in the geographic cluster of the firm and its neighboring clusters. The geographic clusters within such a group are indexed by h, with an individual cluster being defined by a county q. As shown by Fig. C.2 in the Appendix, a county has on average seven neighbors. The instrument draws its validity from the observation that in China, clusters of iron and steel firms are found in particular areas of the country (see Fig. B.1 and Fig. B .2 in the Appendix). Industrial clusters capture unobserved time varying heterogeneity affecting T1000P exposure such as social, environmental, political or institutional characteristics of a formerly planned economy. As firm fixed effects are controlled for, our instrument would be expected to have only limited influence on the performance of an individual firm. The instrument τ i IV is based on year 2005 observations, and for a firm i in county q is given as
where d qh is the distance in kilometers between the firm's county q and neighboring counties. The distance weight of a firm's own county is 1. The ratio of treated firms to the total number of firms in a cluster is ϕ h . Note that τ i IV does not differ between firms belonging to the same cluster q. Descriptive statistics of τ i IV are given in Table C .18 in the Appendix.
The empirical estimation is based on a panel data two-stage least squares (2SLS) within estimator, and controls for firm fixed effects and allows for a correlation of errors between the two stages. Given that τ i is a binary variable and the outcome variable of the second stage is continuous, we follow Angrist (2001) and use a linear probability model (LPM) in the first stage. As noted in Angrist (2001) , the estimation of a 2SLS model applying a LPM in the first stage bears the benefit of consistency, irrespective of whether or not the first-stage conditional expectation function is linear. As all variables included in the first stage are of limited range, the supporting restriction for LPM (i.e., of no regressor having infinite support) is satisfied. Eq. (4) is first within transformed, thereby accounting for α i , and then a 2SLS methodology is applied instrumenting for τ i by τ i IV in the first stage. This approach is described in detail in Baltagi (2008) . Our instrument τ i IV is found to be valid. 13 Results indicate that instrumenting for T1000P selection yields overall treatment effects (see Table C .20 in the Appendix) that are very similar in terms of magnitude and significance to the benchmark results of all three model specifications (see Table 3 ). TC gains in magnitude, while SEC loses significance. However, the estimated effect of the T1000P on treated firms' annual TFP change is consistent with the benchmark specification.
Time-varying confounders
Our main results rely on the assumption that there are no omitted time-varying and firm-specific effects correlated with T1000P participation and the outcome variable. We have conducted an extensive review of policies potentially affecting the iron and steel sector during the study period, and found one program that could be a potential confounder. Along with the goal of reducing inefficient energy use in energy-intensive industries via the T1000P program, the national government also implemented a program to eliminate outdated production capacity during the Eleventh FYP. The program defined production technologies that would be limited or eliminated in all sectors (NDRC, 2005a) . For the iron and steel sector, outdated technologies included blast furnaces for iron smelting with a capacity less than 300 cubic meters (NDRC, 2005b) . A detailed implementation plan was announced in 2006 (NDRC, 2006) . To test for potential confounding effects, we located a list of firms in a subset of provinces that were subject to the first phase of this program (NDRC, 2007) . These firms were required to shut down, retire or update part of their production capacity. Though significance of the treatment effects drops mildly due to a much smaller sample size, the size of the effects remains very close to the benchmark results of all three model specifications listed in Table 3 (see Table C .21 in the Appendix).
TFP change based on production function and index numbers
To test the robustness of our results to the choice of productivity estimation approach, we also used alternative approaches to measure TFPC based on the estimation of a parametric production function and on the use of index numbers. In the case of the former, we implemented the production function approach of Wooldridge (2009) . 14 In addition, we also applied the models of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2015) . All models are based on a value-added production function. The results of overall treatment effects on TFP change are robust in terms of magnitude and significance.
Further, we decided to use the Törnqvist index, as described in Coelli et al. (2003) , and an index derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function. Since the entire population of Chinese iron and steel firms between 2003 and 2008 is observed (5340 firms or 27,076 observations, see Table 1 ), following Greenstone et al. (2012) we estimate transitive multilateral TFP by applying an index 13 First stage results are shown in Table C .19 in the Appendix. The Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993) rejects at a 1 percent significance level, indicating that the benchmark ATT variable may be endogenous. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM and rk Wald Fstatistics (Kleibergen & Paap, 2006 ) both reject at a significance level of 1%.
14 Wooldridge (2009) shows that the moment conditions of the complicated two-step semi-parametric approach of Olley and Pakes (1996) to control for the simultaneity bias and the modification to it proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) can be implemented in a GMM framework yielding more efficient estimates among other advantages. The approach proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) cannot be applied because M. Filippini, et al. China Economic Review 59 (2020) 101364 number approach. 15 We employ a Cobb-Douglas production function with homogeneity in input factors and Hicks-neutral (Hicks & John, 1963) (9) with small letters indicating variables in natural logarithms. Year-and subindustry s-specific input elasticities, i.e. input cost shares, are denoted by β s . Capital costs k it consist of interest and depreciation expenses. Opportunity cost of equity is assumed to be 3%. Labor costs l it are the sum of wage and welfare payments and m it is the cost of intermediate inputs. Subsequently, TFP change is derived by taking the first derivative of the TFP estimates. As this non-parametric approach lacks the capacity to control for noise, TFP changes outside the 0.1 and 99.9 percentiles have been excluded. The control group is matched using propensity score matching to the nearest five neighbors with replacement, resulting in 118 matched firms and a total of 538 control group observations. The assumption of a parallel trend holds for the new treatment and control samples (see Table C .22 in the Appendix). We find a positive effect of the regulation on firm level TFP change at a significance level of 10% (see Table C .23 in the Appendix) in the three model specifications. Also using a Törnqvist index we come to the same empirical results in terms of magnitude and significance of treatment effects. Finally, we include the treatment effect variable directly into the cost function of Eq. (4) and find a negative and significant (at 5% level) effect of the treatment on costs. This implies that directly using a classical difference-in-difference approach on cost confirms the results obtained through a "two-step approach" (via TFPC). Results are available upon request.
Conclusion
We find that the first major national energy efficiency program in China had a positive, statistically-significant effect on annualized TFP change in iron and steel firms. The gains we observe are economically significant and robust to multiple alternative empirical strategies. In our base specification, we estimate that the average annual private economic benefit due to enhanced productivity for a treated firm was 148.7 mRMB in 1998 values. A back-of-the-envelope calculation using one estimate of US $22.5 billion (IEPD, 2007) to approximate the investment in energy conservation by T1000P firms suggests that on average each firm invested approximately 171 mRMB between 2006 and 2008. Inflating our estimate of annualized benefits to~200 mRMB in 2007 values, we find that the energy efficiency investments undertaken imply an undiscounted payback period of less than one year for the average firm. Importantly, this estimate does not account for any subsidies provided to firms, nor does it capture the cost of administering the program.
Our main estimation results suggest that technical change and scale efficiency change were about equally important in contributing to productivity improvements under the national T1000P. This implies that to some extent firms may have been able to comply with the program simply by increasing the scale of their operations. However, scaling up was not the whole story. At least half of the productivity growth is, on average, attributed to technical change. This share was even larger in the extended analysis employing a production function and in the provincial program estimation, which focuses on smaller firms and better controls for differences in firm scale. Technical change encompasses equipment adjustments or upgrades, or changes to management practices that increased emphasis on energy conservation in performance targets and personnel incentives. Consistent with a role for technical change, prior studies qualitatively describe how T1000P firms in the iron and steel industry upgraded equipment and processes to improve energy efficiency (Ke et al., 2012) , and did so relatively quickly after the program began .
An important exercise would involve quantifying the heterogeneity in investment inefficiencies across firms. In other words, we would be interested to know the distribution of g i in Eq. (1). Firms included in the program were all large energy users, but these firms likely differed in their awareness of, and access to, support for energy efficiency upgrades. Our observation of net positive productivity effects on average mask heterogeneity in firm level effects. Some firms may have overinvested relative to the efficient level prior to the program, in which case we expect the T1000P to have negatively affected the productivity of these firms. Future research could help to characterize this heterogeneity, as well as the degree to which one-size-fits-all programs impose a high cost on some firms.
A striking feature of our estimates is that they suggest firms benefited from energy efficiency investments in a relatively short amount of time, i.e. within the first few program years. The substantial short-run benefits we estimate contrast with nearly all prior studies of the productivity effects of energy and environmental regulations, which point to short-run costs (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017; Koźluk & Zipperer, 2013) . These short-run benefits are further consistent with evidence of input cost savings achieved by the average treated firm: when we estimate model (1) using the log of materials cost instead of TFP growth as the independent variable (and control for scale), we find the program is associated with a reduction in materials cost of 13.5% (in log points) that is statistically significant at the 10% level. The lack of reliable sources of firm data for extending our panel beyond 2008 constrains our focus to short-run effects; however, estimating long-run effects as well as general equilibrium effects of energy efficiency programs in rapidly developing countries is an important area for future research.
The positive effects of the T1000P suggest that investment inefficiencies in developing countries may be substantial. Moreover, (footnote continued) investments of many firms in our sample are observed to be negative, whereby investments are derived from changes in the real capital stock. 15 Given that we observe the entire population of firms, our approach of measuring TFP via four-digit industry specific cost shares used as input elasticities avoids several well-known caveats associated with estimating TFP from a subsample of a population. Examples discussed extensively in the literature are a simultaneity between unobserved productivity and either input choices or entry/exit decisions (attrition bias).
M. Filippini, et al. China Economic Review 59 (2020) 101364 these inefficiencies do not appear to be due to capital constraints specific to particular firm categories (e.g., SOEs). Instead, it seems that raising awareness and pressure to save energy prompted firms to take up profitable energy efficiency investments. Importantly, it may have created a new form of reputational benefit associated with target achievement that reduced uncertainty in the payoff to participating firms. Future work is needed to more precisely characterize the origins of the energy efficiency gap in these settings, and derive lessons for the design of effective interventions. While our study has focused on a state-led intervention, a wide range of private initiatives exist to raise energy efficiency, e.g. between buyers and suppliers, for which the productivity consequences are not well understood. Our findings suggest that state-led programs such as the T1000P (and subsequent T10000P) in China and the analogous Perform, Achieve, and Trade energy efficiency scheme in India may, however imperfectly, be addressing investment inefficiencies, even if they do not reduce energy use in absolute terms. Importantly, although energy efficiency programs are often justified as pro-environmental, they are not a substitute for, and at best may be complementary to, policies that directly address the environmental externalities of energy use, such as emissions taxes or cap-and-trade programs. In many countries, energy efficiency programs form a pillar of national strategies for reducing energyrelated air pollution and mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. However, energy use decisions would not reflect these social costs as long as the associated externalities remain unpriced. Subsidies for energy in developing countries exacerbate the problem, to the extent that they encourage overuse of fossil energy sources. On the other hand, with prices that reflect the marginal social cost of energy use, carefully targeted energy efficiency policies that address investment inefficiencies could support the effectiveness of price-based mechanisms.
